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Commentary on Phillip A. Karber and Jerald A. Combs, "The United States, NATO, and the 
Soviet Threat to Western Europe: Military Estimates and Policy Options, 1945-1963"
John S. Duffield*
Introduction
Thanks to a wealth of new documents made possible by the end
of the Cold War, many historians are reconsidering the origins, 
evolution, consequences, and meaning of that historic conflict.1 
Deserving particular attention in this process of reassessment is
*     I wish to thank to Phillip Karber and Jerald Combs for 
providing me with copies of several of the documents cited in 
their article that are located in the Karber Collection.
the East-West political-military confrontation in the heart of 
Europe, which did so much to define the Cold War.  How did that 
confrontation come about?  Could it have been avoided, or at 
least mitigated in intensity, and possibly brought to a peaceful 
conclusion at an earlier date?  How appropriate was Western 
policy in the region?  The search for ever better-informed 
answers to such questions must rank high among scholarly 
priorities.
Consequently, the article by Phillip Karber and Jerald Combs
represents a potentially valuable contribution to current 
historical debates.  Its primary goal is to shed new light on 
Western intelligence estimates of the Soviet military threat to 
Western Europe during the early Cold War.  In particular, the 
article seeks to appraise the validity of those assessments, and 
thus the appropriateness of the Western military plans that 
flowed from them, in view of what we now know about actual Soviet
conventional capabilities at the time.  A second and derivative 
objective is to evaluate the existing scholarship on Western 
threat assessments.  How accurately have historians and others 
portrayed them?
This commentary assesses the article in terms of both of 
these goals.  What do Karber and Combs add to our existing 
knowledge of Western threat assessments?  And do they cause us to
call into question the judgments of previous scholarship?  In 
order to keep my comments to a reasonable length, I will 
concentrate on those parts of the article that concern the 1950s 
and, to a lesser extent, the early 1960s.  My principal rationale
for this choice of focus is that, prior to the outbreak of the 
Korean War in mid-1950, the impact of Western estimates of Soviet
capabilities on Western planning was attenuated by relatively 
benign assessments of Soviet intentions.  In addition, I am less 
familiar with the details of Western threat assessments conducted
before the establishment of NATO in 1949.
I find that Karber and Combs add somewhat to our 
understanding of Western military estimates and confirm a number 
of previous findings.  They do not, however, present as much new 
information as they suggest, and their critique of the existing 
literature is largely unfounded.  This commentary concludes with 
a brief discussion of some of the important questions that remain
for historians to answer.2
New Information?
Perhaps the most valuable contribution of the article lies 
in its evaluation of the accuracy of Western assessments.  To 
this end, Karber and Combs have juxtaposed much of the 
information that is now available on actual Soviet military 
capabilities during the period in question with Western estimates
of those capabilities at the time.  In this way, they are able to
show (pp. 15-16)3 that Western military analysts first 
overestimated and then underestimated overall Soviet 
capabilities.  In the late 1940s, the Soviet army may have 
contained as few as 1.8 million men, although Western 
intelligence put the total at 2.5 million.  In the 1950s, in 
contrast, Western analysts continued to peg the size of the Red 
Army at 2.5 million even as the actual figure climbed to as high 
as 3.6 million.  At the same time, Karber and Combs argue (p. 4) 
that those analysts were nevertheless able to construct accurate 
estimates of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe, which 
constituted a subset of overall Soviet capabilities.
A second noteworthy aspect of the article is the 
considerable detail that it provides on the methods by which 
Western analysts arrived at these estimates.  Particularly 
interesting is the description of how analysts used the Field 
Post Numbers of Soviet units to determine their existence, 
location, and activities (pp. 7-8, esp. note 22).  Of related 
interest are the discussions of why Western analysts adhered to 
the estimate of 2.5 million men in Soviet army despite the 
receipt of information suggesting that this figure was either too
low (p. 21) or too high (pp. 33-34).
Third, Karber and Combs perform a useful scholarly service 
by presenting additional evidence that confirms previous 
scholarly characterizations of U.S. estimates of Soviet military 
capabilities in the 1950s, including the size of the active 
Soviet army (2.5 million men), the number of Soviet divisions, 
both active (175) and reserve (140), and their manning levels in 
peacetime (60-80 percent).4  Nevertheless, although their 
comparison of what analysts then thought and what we now know is 
original, much of the detail that Karber and Combs provide about 
the content of Western estimates in the 1950s and early 1960s is 
not.  Likewise, they offer little information on NATO strategy, 
force requirements, and actual military capabilities that has not
been described elsewhere, often on the basis of the same primary 
sources that they cite.5
Not only do Karber and Combs offer no fundamental challenge 
to the picture that other scholars have drawn of Western 
estimates and NATO planning, moreover, but they oversimplify the 
documentary record by overlooking important evidence and critical
distinctions.  To be sure, space constraints typically preclude 
the inclusion of all possibly relevant data.  But it is striking 
that Karber and Combs dwell much more on the indicators of Soviet
strength that appear in the assessments than they do on the 
available evidence of Soviet weaknesses.  Similarly, wherever a 
range of estimates is to be found in the archives, they have 
tended to note only the highest of those available.  Any of the 
qualifications of Soviet capabilities contained in the documents 
that they do present are typically confined to the notes.  This 
consistent pattern of selective reporting raises questions about 
the accuracy of their portrayal of Western estimates.
With regard to overall Soviet capabilities, for example, 
Karber and Combs argue (pp. 13-14) that the Soviet Union had 
enough tanks to equip all 175 active divisions, and possibly 140 
or so reserve divisions as well.  In so doing, they play down the
fact that many Soviet divisions had little organic armor (note 
47) and that, on average, Soviet divisions contained perhaps as 
few as 100 armored fighting vehicles each.6
With regard to Soviet mobilization schedules, Karber and 
Combs mention (pp. 10-11 and 14) only those estimates stating 
that the active army divisions could be ready by M+5 and the 
reserve divisions by M+30.  They fail to note the longer 
estimates, of up to M+30 and M+180, respectively, that can be 
found in the archives.7  In fact, at least one of the documents 
that they cite (JCS 2073/7) clearly describes the M+5/M+30 
estimates as "maximum" Soviet ground force mobilization 
capabilities.
With regard to Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, Karber and 
Combs mention numbers of divisions and the increase in manning 
levels that took place in Germany in the late 1940s and early 
1950s (pp. 19-20).  They do not acknowledge, however, the 
relatively small size of the Soviet division slice, even when 
fully manned, in comparison with its NATO counterparts or the 
expectation of at least some U.S. analysts that the Soviet Union 
would need to maintain substantial forces in the satellite 
countries.8  In addition, they fail to differentiate (pp. 21-23) 
between those satellite divisions likely to participate in an 
attack on the Central Region, which is the geographical focus of 
their study, and those located in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania 
that would have been employed elsewhere.
Perhaps most problematic of all are the figures that Karber 
and Combs offer (pp. 20 and 24-25) for the estimated size (100 or
more divisions) of a reinforced Soviet attack against Western 
Europe, which was a critical Western planning factor.  Once 
again, they fail to distinguish between the magnitude of the 
total threat to the region and the smaller number of divisions 
that would likely have been brought to bear on the central 
front.9  And they again cite only the highest available figures 
for Western estimates, overlooking the range of estimates that 
actually appear in U.S. documents.10  Finally, the provenance of 
some of the numbers in the tables for Soviet divisions is 
unclear, since they do not appear in the given citations.
New Analysis?
In the process of describing Western intelligence estimates,
Karber and Combs seek to set their work apart from the existing 
literature on the subject, their assessment of which is highly 
critical.  Most importantly, they take previous studies to task 
for wrongly charging that Western analysts intentionally 
exaggerated Soviet military capabilities (pp. 2, 23, and 38).  
They argue, in contrast, that U.S. and NATO intelligence 
estimates of the threat to Western Europe were generally accurate
and that, in any case, no deliberate overestimation took place 
(p. 4).
There are at least two problems with these claims.  First, 
the principal historical work with which they take issue, a 1982 
article by Matthew Evangelista, focuses explicitly on the late 
1940s, a period during which Karber and Combs agree (pp, 15-16 
and 38) that Western estimates probably overstated Soviet 
strength.11  Evangelista's suggestion that many in the West may 
have intentionally exaggerated the threat during that period is 
not a central part of his argument, being confined to two pages 
at the end of the article.  In any case, this suggestion does not
seem unreasonable in view of the extensive evidence concerning 
actual Soviet capabilities that he presents, evidence that Karber
and Combs do not refute.
Second, and more fundamentally, Karber and Combs blur an 
important set of distinctions.  In order to understand this 
failing, it is necessary to recognize that three separate 
questions are at issue.  The first concerns what Soviet military 
capabilities actually were.  The second concerns what Western 
analysts thought they were.  The third concerns what Western 
political leaders said they were.
Karber and Combs deal primarily with the accuracy of Western
estimates; that is, the correspondence between actual Soviet 
capabilities and Western intelligence estimates of them.  In 
contrast, the work of mine that they cite addresses the 
correspondence between Western military estimates and public 
characterizations of the threat by Western leaders.12   In fact, 
that article pointedly argues that Western assessments in the 
1950s were far more nuanced than was suggested by public 
pronouncements, which typically portrayed the threat in 
unqualified terms.  It nowhere claims that the intelligence 
estimates themselves were exaggerated.
Thus, given the multiplicity of issues involved, there is 
not necessarily a conflict between their position and the premise
of my article.  To the contrary, it is possible -- indeed, the 
record suggests -- both that military analysts offered honest, if
not always accurate, estimates of Soviet capabilities and that 
Western political leaders often portrayed the threat in 
exaggerated terms.  Karber and Combs either miss or gloss over 
this fundamental point.
Unanswered Questions
In closing, it is worth noting some of the important 
questions raised by Karber and Combs that remain unanswered and 
that might serve as a useful focus for future scholarly inquiry. 
Their article is not the last word on the subject of Soviet 
military capabilities and the validity of Western threat 
assessments, something that they explicitly acknowledge (p. 3).
One multifaceted question is who knew what and when?  Karber
and Combs frequently imply that estimates from the mid- and late 
1940s informed Western planning in the early 1950s.  
Nevertheless, we still do not know with any certainty whether and
to what degree Western analysts continued to base their 
assessments on information that was acquired before the formation
of NATO.  Perhaps we have simply not yet found the relevant 
contemporary documents in which this intelligence was updated.  A
related matter concerns the familiarity of political leaders with
the details of military estimates when they spoke publicly about 
the threat.  Which documents had they seen?  What was the content
of the briefings that they had received?
A second set of issues regards the assessment process 
itself, especially within the United States.  What role did each 
of the various extant intelligence units play in the process?  
What information did they share with one another?  Much of the 
information that Karber and Combs present come from documents 
prepared within the U.S. Army.  Can we be sure that this 
information was always made available to and considered at higher
levels?  Related to this are uncertainties about the reasons for 
the persistence in U.S. estimates of overall Soviet capabilities 
despite the receipt of potentially inconsistent information.  
Although Karber and Combs offer some plausible explanations (pp. 
17, 21, and 33-34), their discussion is highly speculative, 
suggesting the need for further research.
A further set of unanswered questions concerns the details 
of NATO military planning.  On which threat assessments were the 
alliance's defense plans actually based?  In particular, can we 
safely assume that NATO planners had access to and were free to 
use all of the information to be found in classified U.S. 
documents?  And given a particular estimate of Soviet 
capabilities, how did NATO planners determine alliance force 
requirements?  Again, Karber and Combs offer some interesting 
speculation on the subject (pp. 28-29) but few hard facts.  
Finally, what were the details of NATO war plans at various 
times?
Of course, answering questions of this nature is not likely 
to be easy.  Inquiry into these topics is likely to be burdened 
by the traditionally cautious attitude of the intelligence 
community toward the revelation of sources and methods, no matter
how dated they may be.  At the same time, a better understanding 
of NATO planning will probably require access to the internal 
records of the alliance, which may be extremely difficult to come
by, even assuming that relevant documents exist.  Consequently, 
these are areas in which the organized efforts of historians to 
achieve the opening of early Cold War archival materials may be 
highly worthwhile.
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